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Abstract  
We first study the characteristics of the crisis and its impacts on Taiwanese and Korean 
economies. We have examined 22 macroeconomic fundamentals, such as inflation rates, government 
budget, trade balance, external debt, money supply, and ratios of average monthly imports and cumulative 
inward portfolio investment to international reserves, and compared with an extensive data set of the two 
countries.  The comparisons point out that the macro fundamentals of both countries are basically the 
same, except the international finance sector.  After defining currency crisis and banking crisis, the causes 
of crises are identified as the nominal exchange rates and the short-term external debt to international 
reserves ratios.  In view of this, we use cointegration and causality tests to examine the relationship 
between these two time series.  We have found a unidirectional causality from the short-term debt ratio to 
the exchange rate for Korea, but no causality between the two for Taiwan.  The paper ends with some 
discussions on the lessons and challenges from the experiences of the two countries. 
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1.  Introduction  
It is well known that Korea and Taiwan are the only two non-city-state countries, other than 
Japan, which have achieved and maintained rapid modern economic growth since the end of WWII.  As 
such, most studies often lump them together as both countries achieved impressive growth through rapid 
industrialization and accelerated exports, like two wheels of a cart.  Thus they are generally treated as 
twins, if not identical, in the world capitalistic development. 
In recent years, however, their differences in the development process are also come to light. 
Taiwan relied more on domestic savings and direct foreign investment, along with emphasis on the 
contribution of small-and-medium size enterprises.  Korea depended on foreign borrowing, incurring 
large external debt, with major role played by large conglomerates or chaebols in industrialization and 
trade.  What are the impacts of Asian financial crisis on these differences? 
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After the Asian financial crisis broke out in Thailand in the mid-1997, it spread quickly to the 
neighboring countries.  The impacts of the crisis and the responses in these two countries are quite 
different.  Taiwan seems to fare much better than most of the neighboring countries while Korea was 
severely affected.  In 1998, the growth rate of current GDP in US dollars of Korea dipped to –32.6% (–
8.5% in 1997), and that of Taiwan was –7.8% (4.76% in 1997), which is better than that of Japan, as 
Japan fell to –9.6% (–8.4% in 1997).   This is shown by the columns of Figure 1, indicating quite 
different responses of the twins.1  The economy of these three countries recovered very quickly in the 
following year.  In 1999, the above growth rate of Korea increased to whopping 29%, that of Taiwan, to 
10%, and of Japan, to 19%.  It appears that both Taiwan and Korea, and for that matter, the Southeast 
Asian countries, are already on the way to full recovery, although some lingering problems still exist 
among them.  What are the reasons for such large differences?  
Due to its possible global contagion, extensive literature already exists on Asian financial crisis, 
including crisis in Korea.  However, few papers deal with Taiwan, as Taiwanese data are generally not 
available from the international organizations, and much less on the comparisons of different responses of 
Taiwan and Korea.  The purpose of this paper is to examine economic characteristics and macroeconomic 
policy responses of the twins.  We first discuss the causes and contagion of recent financial crisis.  We 
then study the characteristics of the crisis and the distinct impacts on Taiwanese and Korean economies.  
We submit that, since Korea was one of the four countries, along with Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia, 
which were severely affected by the recent financial crises, and Taiwan was only slightly affected, 
comparisons of the two the twins using the time series analysis may contribute to the understanding of the 
cause and causality effects of the crisis.   
Thus, after reviewing some explanations of the causes of the recent Asian financial crisis in 
Section 2, Section 3 examines 22 macroeconomic fundamentals.  In the real sector, we have examined 
current GDP and current GDP per capita, their percentage growth rates, inflation rate, the lending rates of 
banks, government budget, fiscal surplus-GDP ratios, unemployment rates, money supply (M2) to GDP 
ratios.  In the external and financial sectors, we examine the balance of trade, the current account balance, 
international reserves, ratios of the average monthly imports to international reserves, ratios of cumulative 
inward portfolio investment to international reserves, the total external debt, ratios of total external debt to 
international reserves, short-term external debt, ratios of short-term external debt to international reserves, 
exchange rates and their percentage changes, and the year-end stock indexes and their percentage 
changes. 
The sources and impacts of financial crisis in Korea and Taiwan are explained in Section 4.  The 
financial crisis is considered as the interaction between the currency crisis and the banking crisis.  Section 
5 examines the empirical findings of the linkage between the two crises, which are then reduced to the 
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causality relation between the nominal exchange rate series and the ratios of short-term external debt to 
international reserves series.  Thus, in Sections 6 and 7, we examine first the stationarity of both time 
series data, and then their cointegration, and finally the causality relation by the error correction model for 
Korea and the standard Granger causality test for Taiwan.  Once again, we find the differences between 
Taiwan and Korea.  Section 8 ends the paper with comparing the Korean case with Taiwan, and discusses 
the lessons and challenges from the experience of the two countries and the prospects for the future. 
 
2.  Four explanations of the crisis 
There are at least four explanations of the onset of Asian financial crisis:   
(a) It is simply a phase of growth cycle.  There was an economic downturn during 1983-85, which 
recovered and started over a decade of high growth.  The pace of growth changed at the beginning of 
1990, and a downturn was expected around 1994 (Ichimura, et al., 1998, 1).  Thus, the crisis in the mid-
1997 was not unexpected.    
(b) Over-supply of labor intensive goods, such as footwear, textile products, and electronic products, and 
the rise of China as a large exporter, have reduced export earnings of East and Southeast Asian countries 
(IMF, 1997; Park, 1996).  China’s 50% devaluation of yuan in early 1994 accelerated the trend.  The rise 
of Mexican exports and enactment of NAFTA treaties also intensify competition in East and Southeast 
Asian.   
(c) Basic weakness in Asian financial management and capitalism.  Financial liberalization in Asian 
began in early 1990s.  It was at best haphazard and incomplete.  Increasing banking activity, growing 
short-term external debt, and its exposure to international capital market, along with the inadequate 
regulation and supervision, corruption, inefficiency, led to the increase in real estate speculation and non-
performing loans (Krugman, 1998; Goldstein, 1998). The pegged exchange rates depleted the 
international reserves and aggravated the crisis. 
(d) Self-fulfilling crisis and overreaction of the financial market.  The macroeconomic fundamentals are, 
although not perfect, basically sound.  However, once a liquidity crisis of a firm sets in, no creditor will 
make a loan if each creditor expects no other creditors will provide a new loan to repay the existing debt.  
Thus, when more and more foreign investors withdrew the loans, more and more domestic banks and 
firms will be driven into illiquidity and eventual insolvency (Radelet and Sachs, 1998).   The panic then 
spread to the whole country and transmitted to other countries. 
 We submit that all four explanations reflect some aspects of the recent financial crisis and are 
consistent with our observations.  Korea is one of the most affected countries in this financial crisis.  
What happened in Korea?  We consider that the last two explanations seem more plausible. 
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3.   Comparisons of Taiwanese and Korean economies in the 1990s  
Several papers have discussed the macroeconomic background of financial crisis (Kaminsky and 
Reinhart, 2000; Alba, et al., 1999; Agenor, 2000).  In this paper, we select some macroeconomic 
fundamentals to show similarity and difference among the economies of Taiwan, Korea, and Japan.  For 
this purpose, instead of cluttering the paper with numbers, we use charts to visualize and dramatize the 
changes in some important macroeconomic variables over time from 1989 to 1999.  To be consistent in 
data collection, most of the annual data of 1989-1999 in this section are taken from the latest issue of 
ICSEAD (2000), except those few noted otherwise.   
Figures 1 to 10 compare economic conditions of Taiwan (in heavy solid lines or dark solid 
columns) and Korea (in heavy dotted lines and lightly filled columns), along with Japan (in light solid 
lines and empty columns), in 22 categories numbered in square brackets.  Whenever possible, we have 
tried to compare the development patterns of these three countries, as they are closely related by 
international trade, and are historically had similar development patterns.2   Among the labels, J/10 in 
Figures 1, 2, 5, 6, and 8, or K/10 in Figure 9 implies that the Japanese or Korean data were reduced to 
one-tenth of the original value to fit into the diagrams.  Thus, if a curve has been so indicated, the curve 
itself may only be used to compare the differences in the shape or fluctuations, the reader should be aware 
that the actual curve is ten times higher or larger than that plotted in the graph.  To save space, we also 
created the secondary (right) Y-axis.  All line charts use the left-hand side primary Y-axis, and all column 
charts use the right-hand side secondary Y-axis, the titles and labels of which are typed in italic.  Each 
category of macroeconomic variables are numbered and enclosed in square brackets.  They are explained 
briefly as follows. 
 
A.  The real sector 
In Figures 1 and 2, the patterns of current GDP [1] and current GDP per capita (GDPpc) [3], all in 
U.S. dollars, for the three countries are very similar, all enjoying a robust economic growth until the peak 
year of both GDP and GDP per capita in 1995 for Japan, 1996 for Korea, and 1997 for Taiwan.  They 
then turned downward and reached a local minimum simultaneously in 1998.  In terms of the growth 
rates, %gGDP [2] and %gGDPpc [4], registered a negative value in 1998 for the first time for all three 
countries when the Thai baht plunged in the mid-1997.  Korea’s growth rates were most severely affected, 
decreased more than 30% in 1998, although Korea’s GDP and GDP per capita growth rates were 
generally higher than those of Taiwan before 1995.  It appeared that Korea was catching up with Taiwan3 
in the 1990s. 
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    ------------------------ 
    Place Figure 1 here 
    ------------------------  
    ------------------------ 
    Place Figure 2 here 
    ------------------------  
The inflation rates in terms of consumer prices,4 [6] in Figure 3, of Taiwan and Korea also had a 
similar pattern, both were decreasing up to 1997, but Korea’s inflation rate almost doubled from 4.7% in 
1997 to 8.2% in 1998, while that of Taiwan continued to decrease from 2.98% in 1996 to mere 0.9% in 
1997.  Their lending rates of banks5 [7] also tended to decrease until 1996.  But Korea’s lending rates 
increased from 8.84% in 1996 to 11.88% in 1997 and whopping 15.28% in 1998, while that of Taiwan 
increased only slightly from 7.53% in 1996 to 7.65% in 1997 and 7.87% in 1998, the trend of which was 
similar to Japan.  Note that for both inflation rates and lending rates, Korea’s rates are generally one to 
three percentage points higher than those of Taiwan, and Taiwan’s rates continue to decrease or maintain 
the same levels after the crisis.  These probably indicate a better management of the Taiwanese monetary 
authority before and after the onset of the Asian financial crisis in the mid-1997.   However, Figure 3 also 
shows that both Korea and Taiwan had fiscal deficits [5] in 1991 and 1992, but Korea’s fiscal budgets 
turned positive after 1993, while those of Taiwan and Japan stayed negative.  Korea had fiscal surplus to 
GDP ratios of about 0.4% to 0.6% during the four years just before the 1997 financial crisis, while 
Taiwan experienced 1.11% to 3.95% of deficit to GDP ratios and Japan, 1.6% to 4.2% deficit to GDP 
ratios.  All three countries ran budget deficits in 1997.   
    ------------------------ 
    Place Figure 3 here 
    ------------------------  
Although we have not shown in the figures here, we have confirmed that, in terms of percentage 
of GDP, all three countries also had similar patterns in the private and government consumptions, fixed 
investment, and no drastic changes in these ratios before and after the 1997 crisis have been detected.  
The major difference is that Korea’s fixed investment to GDP ratios, which range from 35% to 38.8%, are 
much higher than those of Taiwan (20.7% to 23.7%), probably explaining Korea’s higher GDP growth 
rates in the pre-crisis period of the early 1990s.  Despite higher growth rates, Figure 4 shows that the 
unemployment rates [9] of Korea are generally 0.5% to 1.0% higher than those of Taiwan before 1995.  
They are, however, very low as compared with those in the developed countries, except in 1998 and 1999, 
showing the dire effect of the impacts of financial crisis.  Through out the 1990s, Korea’s broad money 
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supply (M2) to GDP ratios [8] were much lower than those of Taiwan, and there were not much changes 
in the ratios for all three countries even after the 1997 crisis.   Thus, in general, Korea’s real sector 
macroeconomic foundation appeared to be as good as, or even better than, those of Taiwan before the 
crisis. 
    ------------------------ 
    Place Figure 4 here 
    ------------------------  
 
B.  The external and financial sectors  
The major differences between Korea and Taiwan appear in the external and financial sectors.  
While the data show that merchandize imports and exports increased steadily during the 1990s for all 
three countries, the balance of trade6, [11] in Figure 5, and the current account balance, [13] in Figure 6, 
of Taiwan and Japan have been consistently positive, while those of Korea have been almost always 
negative before 1997, except a mere US$ 1 billion current account surplus in 1993.  Korea’s current 
account balance even fell to US$ –23 billion in 1996.  Both balances of Korea increased quite 
dramatically from US$ -8 billion in 1997 to about US$ 40 billion in 1998, although both balances 
decreased to about US$ 24 billion in 1999.  A reason given for the difference between Taiwan and Korea 
is the nature of outward foreign direct investment (OFDI).  Taiwan’s OFDI is export-oriented, still using 
Taiwan’s machinery and intermediate goods exported to the host countries, while that of Korea is local-
market oriented, resulting in misalignment of home and host countries’ production structures (Chen and 
Ku, 2000, 142). 
    ------------------------ 
    Place Figure 5 here 
    ------------------------  
    ------------------------ 
    Place Figure 6 here 
    ------------------------  
The general trends of trade and current account deficits of Korea and surpluses of Taiwan and 
Japan are reflected in the much higher international reserves [16], in Figure 8, of Taiwan (US$ 73 billion 
to 90 billion) and Japan (US$ 84 billion to 272 billion) than those of Korea (US$ 14 billion to 52 billion) 
during the decade.  Note that Korea’s international reserves fell from US$ 34 billion in 1996 to US$ 20 
billion in 1997, but increased to US$ 52 billion in 1998.  
The line charts of Figures 5 and 6 show the ratios of the average monthly imports to international 
reserves7 [10] and the ratios of cumulative inward portfolio investment to international reserves8 [12], all 
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are expressed as percentages.   These are the indicators, along with the short-term external debt to 
international reserves ratios, [17] in Figure 8, closely related to the fluctuations in foreign exchange rates 
during the financial crisis.  The ratio of average monthly imports to international reserves is generally 
considered that the lower the better for an economy.  Since its inverse, the ratio of international reserves 
to average monthly imports indicates the ability of a country to pay for its imports in terms of months, it 
is generally considered that 6 months worth of reserves is a minimum safety amount.  Hence, if the 
monthly imports to international reserves ratio is higher than 17% (1/6), that is, if the international 
reserves are not enough to pay for six months of imports, then the country is more vulnerable  to financial 
crisis.  The line chart [10] in Figure 5 shows that Korea has the highest and varied ratios among the three 
countries, ranging from 38% in 1989 to 73% in 1997.  Japan’s ratios are modest, ranging from 48% in 
1991 and decreased continuously to 16% in 1999, while that of Taiwan is the healthiest, ranging from 
mere 7.5% in 1989 to 14% in 1997.  
The indicator [12] in Figure 6 is the ratio of cumulative inward portfolio investment to 
international reserves.9  This inward portfolio investment is highly speculative, it is the source of 
international hot money pursuing stock price changes.  Here, the numerator is the cumulative sum of 
inward portfolio investment from 1980 and afterward.  In fact, from 1991 to 1996, Korea’s cumulative 
inward portfolio investment increased from US$ 2.3 billion to 21.2 billion, and that of Taiwan increased 
from US$ 0.8 billion to 3.2 billion.  During this period, the inward cumulative portfolio investment is 
higher than foreign direct investment in Korea, the former is twice to 18 times higher than the latter, but 
in Taiwan, it ranged 0.6 to 2.6 times higher.  This was another sources of vulnerability of the Korean 
economy.10 
Huge inward portfolio investment may not be a threat in the case of crisis if a country has enough 
international reserves.  Thus, we have to look at the ratio [12].  It is generally considered that the lower is 
the ratio the better.  Over the years, Korea has much higher ratios through out the decade as compared 
with that of Taiwan.  For Korea, it was only 13% in 1989, but increased rapidly and reached whopping 
372% in 1997, and then decreased to 145% in 1998.  This signals the danger of currency crisis in won in 
case of sudden flight of inward portfolio investment.  For Taiwan, the ratios had maintained at a very low 
level.  They were –0.32% in 1989, and increased slightly and steadily to mere 15% in 1996, well within 
the 100% threshold level.   
 Figures 7 and 8 show similar discrepancy between Taiwan and Korea in the international finance 
sector.  The total external debt [14a] for both Taiwan and Korea have been increasing, very slowly for 
Taiwan, from US$ 17 billion in 1989 to only US$ 34 billion in 1997, an increase of 100%, but the 
increase was much more rapid for Korea, from US$ 42 billion in 1989 to US$ 143 billion in 1997, an 
increase of 240%.  Apparently, Korea’s high rate of GDP growth [1] relied heavily on external debt.  By 
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doing so, however, Korea also greatly increased its financial vulnerability, as shown by the total external 
debt to international reserves ratios [15].  Since Taiwanese international reserves [16] are much higher 
than those of Korea, Korea had much higher total debt to reserves ratios, 276% in 1989 to huge 704% in 
1997, as compared with Taiwan’s ratios, which range from mere 23% in 1989 to 40% in 1997.  Note that 
Korea’s short-term external debt [14b] was more than doubled from US$ 28 billion in 1993 to US$ 66 
billion in 1996, which consisted about 50% of the total external debt of that year.  As we will show 
below, since some economists regard the short-term external debt as the culprit of financial crisis, we also 
present the ratio of short-term external debt to international reserves [17] for Taiwan and Korea.  
Taiwan’s ratios range from only 20% in 1989 to 27% in 1997, while those of Korea range from 125% in 
1989 to 347% in 1997, about six to twelve times larger than those of Taiwan. 
    ------------------------ 
    Place Figure 7 here 
     ------------------------ 
    ------------------------ 
    Place Figure 8 here 
     ------------------------ 
 In general, the ratio of total external debt to international reserves [15] shows a country’s 
solvency, and the ratio of the short-term external debt to international reserves [17] indicates the liquidity 
of the country at crisis.  Both ratios for Korea are much higher than the critical point of 100%, at 390% 
and 160%, respectively, in 1996, and 704% and 347%, respectively, in 1997, while those for Taiwan are 
much lower than the critical point of 100%.  Here lies the extremely vulnerability of the Korean economy 
to the international capital market fluctuations.  
 Figures 9 and 10 show the average levels and their percentage changes of the Korean won, the 
New Taiwan dollar, and the Japanese yen per U.S. dollar exchange rates [18] [19], and also the levels and 
percentage changes of the year-end stock indexes11 [20] [21].  Unlike Japan, whose yen continued to 
appreciate until 1995, Taiwan and Korea maintained more or less at the constant levels and percentage 
changes of exchange rates until 1996, moving somewhat around NT$ 26.5 per U.S. dollar for Taiwan and 
about 760 won per U.S. dollar for Korea.  All three currencies started depreciating in 1996 (see the 
columns in Figure 9), and the depreciation of New Taiwan dollar and Korean won reached their peak in 
1998, to NT$ 33.5 per U.S. dollar and 1,400 won per U.S. dollar, although both fell back slightly in 1999.  
Along with other indicators mentioned above, there were signs of quick recovery from the financial crisis 
in 1999. 
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    ------------------------ 
    Place Figure 9 here 
    ------------------------  
    ------------------------ 
    Place Figure 10 here 
    ------------------------  
The year-end stock price indexes, on the other hand, were rather erratic during the whole period.  
The indexes of Taiwan and Korea moved together before 1995 and deviated toward the opposite 
directions to each other, indicating quite different impacts of financial crisis on the two countries.  The 
Taiwan index reached its high of 1.8 in 1997 and fell to 1.4 in 1998.  The Korea index reached its low of 
0.4 in 1997 and recovered slightly to 0.6 in the following year.  Both indexes reached its ten-year high of 
1.8 and 1.2, respectively, in 1999. 
 
4.  Short-term debt, exchange rates, and crisis in Korea 
We have seen that the real sectors of the macroeconomic fundamentals of Korea and Taiwan 
basically have similar performance during the last decade.  The major differences between these two 
countries lie on the external and financial sectors.  Among the variables, we find that the greatest 
discrepancy is shown by the ratios of total external debt to international reserves, that is, series [15] in 
Figure 7.  Since total external debt also includes the long-term external debt, which is bound by long-term 
contracts, the immediate cause of financial crisis may be attributable to the short-term external debt 
(Radelet and Sachs, 1998; Rodrik and Velasco, 1999).  In fact, series [17] of the ratios of short-term 
external debt to international reserves in Figure 8 also yields a similar discrepancy as series [15] between 
the two countries.  Since Taiwan barely faced the recent Asian financial crisis as compared with Korea, 
our finding points to the short-term external debt as the cause of the 1997 financial crisis in Korea, and 
possibly other Southeast Asian countries.  This is consistent with the observation presented in Rodrik and 
Velasco (1999).  
As Korea sought out to join the OECD in the early 1990s, it started financial reform in earnest.12  
The prospects of prosperity that would come along with deregulation, reform, and openness attracted 
foreign capital to Korea in drove.13  This is reflected in the sweeping increase of total external debt [14a], 
especially short-term external debt [14b].  The waves of optimism and the government policy of 
controlling commercial banks to support government’s economic development plans fostered moral 
hazard of excessive lending and borrowing in the expectation that the central bank, the government, or an 
international organization will bail the banks or firms out when things go wrong. 14  In fact, ironically, it 
has been often pointed out that this crony relation between the government and business was one of the 
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factors of Korea’s rapid growth. 15 Under these circumstances, “the Korean banks kept lending to chaebols 
which the government preferred … Korean banks … developed few skills in credit analysis or risk 
management, …  Reflecting the history of directed lending, banks generally did not insist on, or receive, 
full financial information from chaebols” (Shim, 2000, 154).  On the other hand, with easy money, 
Korean firms expanded.  “The debt-to-equity ratio of Korean cooperates was approximately 450 percent 
by the end of 1996, three times the comparable US ratio, and more than five times the comparable 
Taiwanese ratio.”16  
This is not the case of Taiwan.  While the Taiwanese government also encouraged domestic 
savings and allocated capital to selected industrial sectors, capital was invested in the large public 
enterprises and a few large private firms.  The private small-and-medium enterprises seldom received 
funds from the government or banks except export financing.  This has resulted in low debt-equity ratios 
of the Taiwanese firms.  Furthermore, the government didn’t adopt the policy of investment risk-sharing 
with the private enterprises, thus, the Taiwanese economy remained centered around small-and-medium 
enterprises,17 avoiding the problem of moral hazard which occurred in other East Asian countries. 
In the case of Korea, the foreign banks (Japanese, European, or the U.S.) borrowed yen or dollar 
at low interest rates, relend the money at higher rates for short periods to Korean banks, which in turns 
relend the money to local firms for longer periods with higher interest rates (Uchitelle, 1998; Shim, 2000, 
156).  Before June 1997, Korean commercial banks are not required to maintain adequate liquidity ratios 
on the foreign currency assets.  About 20% of the local foreign borrowings were also invested in the 
foreign securities in Thailand, Indonesia, Russia, and Latin America (Shim, ibid.).  The mismatched 
foreign currency dominated borrowings and speculative investment in foreign countries added the 
vulnerability of the banking system and the possible contagion effect when financial crisis occurs.  Using 
a simple two-period model, Rodrik and Velasco (1999) have concluded that the banking crisis (bank run) 
“can only occur when investors take on sufficiently large amounts of short-term debt.”  They point out 
that the larger the stock of such debt, the larger the size of a crisis, and the larger the consequences in 
terms of liquidation and reduced output and consumption. 
On the other hand, the currency crisis occurs when the monetary authority tries to maintain a 
fixed (or fixed within a band) foreign exchange rates (Fukushima and Takii, 1998, 11).  Most developing 
countries pegged their exchange rates to one currency (U.S. dollar or French Franc) or a few currencies so 
to reduce the currency risk to attract inward foreign direct investment from developed countries.  Korea 
was no exception.  Since March 1990, Korea adopted the market average exchange rate system,18 but 
loosely pegged to the U.S. dollar.  It was abandoned only when Korea moved to a complete floating 
system in November 1997 in the midst of financial crisis (EPA, 1998, 270). 
In 1996, Korean exports declined and trade deficit [11] increased due to the decrease in demand 
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for semiconductors and the appreciation of the won against yen, which was induced by the appreciation of 
the U.S. dollar against yen (ibid., 119; Fukushima and Takii, 1998, 146).  The decrease in demand for 
steel in China and the increasing competition in Asian markets forced Hanbo Steel, the flagship of the 14th 
largest chaebol in terms of total assets in 1996, with US$ 6 billion in debt, declared bankruptcy in January 
1997 (Fukushima and Takii, 1998, 142).  The bankruptcy of Sammi Steel (Sammi Chaebol, ranked 26th) 
followed in March.  Then the Kia Motors (Kia Chaebol, ranked 7th), the third largest Korean automaker, 
with US$ 10.6 billion in debt, followed on July 15 (ibid., 143).  The government reacted by letting some 
chaebols to go under, but defended the won at the end of 1997 (Radelet and Sachs, 1998, 1999).  This 
action resulted in the sharp depletion of international reserves, and marked increase in the ratio of the 
short-term external debt to international reserves in 1997.19  This then triggered a chain reaction.   
The foreign creditors, who were already alarmed at the Thailand’s financial crisis in July 1997, 
refused to roll over the short-term debt.  They started pulling capital from Korea, and as the borrowers 
cannot pay back to lenders fast enough, the won devaluated further.  On July 5, 1997, the won plummeted 
to 905.60 per U.S. dollar, the lowest in decade (Fukushima and Takii, 1998, 148).  The news of depletion 
of international reserves sent the won further down to 2,000 won per U.S. dollar by the end of 1997 (EPA, 
1998, 119).  The turmoil in the exchange rate market continued well into 1998.  The average annual 
exchange rate shot up almost 50%, from 951 won in 1997 to 1,400 won per U.S. dollar in 1998, as shown 
in series [18] and [19].  At the same time, the assets value plummeted.  The year-end stock price index 
decreased 26% in 1996 and 42% in 1997, as shown by series [20] and [21].  The government’s defense of 
the won was ineffective, the pegged exchange rate system gave way to the complete floating system on 
December 16, 1997, and the Korean won continued to depreciate. 
 
5.  On currency and banking crises 
We have seen from the analysis in Section 3 that the differences in macroeconomic performance 
between Korea and Taiwan can be found in the external and financial sectors.  The fluctuations of Korean 
exchange rates (won/US$) and the short-term external debt to international reserves ratios (hereafter, the 
short-term debt ratios) seem to be closely related.  Section 4 explains the process of their interaction.  We 
have also shown that, while the financial crisis in Korea and the Southeast Asian countries appears to be 
triggered suddenly by the financial crisis in Thailand in July 1997, the signs of the crisis already revealed 
in 1996, and the root of Korean crisis may be traced back to the early 1990s when the government started 
preparing to join the OECD.  We may say that a long-run undercurrent of crisis has been snowballing for 
a long time,20 and it erupted as a financial crisis only in July 1997.  This may also be the case in Thailand 
and other Southeast Asian countries.21   
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In the literature, banking crises are difficult to identify empirically.  They are “a combination of 
events, such as forced closure, merger, or government takeover of financial institutions, run of banks, ... 
failure to roll over interbank deposits, … the share nonperforming loans in banks’ portfolios, large 
fluctuations in real estate and stock prices, …”, etc. (IMF, 1998, 76).  In this paper, we follow Radelet and 
Sachs (1998) and Rodrik and Velasco (1999) to consider the short-term debt ratios as the major source of 
financial crisis.  On the other hand, in the literature, currency crisis is either “identified simply as a 
substantial nominal currency devaluation” or by an index of foreign exchange market pressure (IMF, 
1998, 76).  In this paper, we consider nominal currency devaluation as the source of financial crisis. 
Based on the various definitions, IMF (1998, 77) has identified, between 1975 and 1997, 158 
episodes of currency crisis and 54 banking crisis.  “For emerging market countries, the frequency of 
currency crises shows no marked trend, while banking crises are clustered in the early 1980s and the 
1990s” (ibid., 77-78).  This is “possibly related to the financial sector liberalization” during this period 
(ibid., 77).  As IMF and other scholars have observed,  
 
Given that the two types of crises may have common origins, or that one type of crisis 
may induce the other, it is not surprising that countries appear to have banking and currency 
crises at around the same time.  In these instances, banking crises preceded currency crises more 
often than the other way round.  … banking crises led currency crises by one year on 13 
occasions, and by two years on 10 other occasions.  The crises were contemporaneous in 12 
instances.  Currency crises preceded banking crises by one year only seven times and by two 
years another four times.  This evidence, while suggestive, should be interpreted with caution in 
view of the difficulties in dating the beginning of banking crisis (ibid., 78).  
 
In view of the interest in the linkage between the currency crisis and the banking crisis, we would 
like to go a step further and examine econometrically the causality between the two crises.  This way, we 
may also avoid the ambiguity problem in dating, namely, timing the beginning and ending of the crises 
(Park, 2000).  So far as we are aware of, the time series analysis of the causality between the two crises 
has not been done in the literature, as most of the analyses have been based on the cross-section data.   
 
6.  The causality test –the case of Korea 
 We now would like to use recently developed econometric techniques to examine the relationship 
and the causality between the nominal exchange rates and the short-term debt ratios using annual data 
from 1979 to 1998 given in ICSEAD (1999, 2000).   
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A.  The unit-root test 
It is well known that many macroeconomic time series are non-stationary.  Therefore, before 
examining the cointegration and the causality between the variables, we employ the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) unit-root test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979, 1981) to examine the stationarity of Korea’s 
nominal exchange rate22 (hereafter, exchange rate) and the short-term debt ratio.  The general equation for 
the ADF test is,  
Dxt  =  a0  + a2 t + a1 xt-1 + i
k
=å 1 bi Dxt-i  + et      (1) 
where xt (level series) is the natural logarithm of Korea’s exchange rate series (or, xt   is the short-term 
debt ratio series), and Dxt is the first-difference series of xt .  The variable t is the time trend.  The variable 
xt-1 is the one-period lag of  xt for the unit-root test, and Dxt-i is the i th lag of the dependent variable.  The 
optimal lag length k is chosen by minimum Akaike information criterion (AIC) (Enders, 1995; Maddala 
and Kim, 1998).  
 Part 1 of Table 1 presents the ADF unit-root test results on the level series.  For a unit- 
root test, the null hypothesis is H0: a1 = 0 (unit-root), against the alternative hypothesis H1: a1  < 0.  For 
Korea’s exchange rate series and the short-term debt ratio series, the test equation (1) includes a constant 
and a statistically significant trend.  Both calculated test-statistics are greater than their critical values at 
the 10% significance level.  Therefore, we cannot reject H0.  Since both level series are not stationary, we 
proceed to test their first-difference series.  The test results are presented in Part 2 of Table 1.  In both 
cases, the calculated test-statistics are less than their critical values at 1% significance level, so we can 
reject H0. 
  Hence, both of the first-difference series of Korea’s exchange rate and the short-term debt ratio 
are I(0), and their level series are I(1). 
    ------------------------ 
    Place Table 1 here 
    ------------------------  
B.  The cointegration test 
Although Korea’s exchange rate and the short-term debt ratio are both I(1) series, it is quite 
possible that they can be cointegrated, and there exists a long-run equilibrium relationship between the 
two series.  There are several testing procedures available for cointegration test, each method has its own 
merits and weakness (Enders, 1995).  Since we have a bivariate case and our sample has only 20 
observations, it is appropriate to use Engle and Granger’s two-step cointegration test to estimate the 
cointegrating equations from both directions and then test the stationarity of both residual series (Engle 
and Granger, 1987, 1991; Enders, 1995; Maddala and Kim, 1998).  
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For this purpose, we generate the residual series from the estimated cointegrating equation (step 
1) and then use the ADF unit-root test to examine the stationarity of the residual series (step 2).  The ADF 
test equation for a unit-root in the residual series is,    
Det  = a et-1  +  å =
k
i 1
bi Det-i  +  nt       (2)  
where Det  is the first-difference series of residuals et, and Det-i  is the ith  lag of  Det .  The value of optimal 
lag length k is selected by minimum AIC method.  nt   is the random error term.  Since the residual series 
is calculated from a cointegrating equation, we do not need to include an intercept or time trend in 
equation (2).  
Table 2 presents the results of the two-step cointegration test for Korea.  When we use the 
exchange rate as the dependent variable in cointegrating regression, the estimated cointegrating equation 
is: 
xt  =  6.119  +  0.035t  + 0.071yt        (3) 
where xt is the logarithmic series of exchange rate, yt is the short-term debt ratio, and variable t is the time 
trend.  From (3), we generate the residual series et, and then applied the ADF unit-root test on et series 
using the test equation (2).   
    ------------------------ 
    Place Table 2 here 
    ------------------------  
On the other hand, when we use the short-term debt ratio as the dependent variable, the estimated 
cointegrating equation is : 
yt  =  -27.445  -  0.290t  +  4.970xt .     (4) 
We then generate the residual series ut
  from (4) and perform the ADF unit-root test using equation (2), 
where e t is replaced by the ut series.  In both cases, the test-statistics are less than the critical values at the 
10% significance level.23  Hence, we can reject H0 : a = 0 in both cases and et and ut series are stationary.  
This implies that Korea’s exchange rate series and the short-term debt ratio series are cointegrated and 
there exists a long-run equilibrium relationship between these two series.  We have shown that Korean 
exchange rate series and the short-term debt ratio series are cointegrated and there exists a long-run 
equilibrium relationship between these two series. 
 
C.  The ECM causality test  
 We have shown above that Korea’s exchange rate and the short-term debt ratio are individually 
I(1) series, and they are cointegrated with order one.  Hence, the error correction model (ECM) is 
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appropriate to use in testing their causality relationship (Engle and Granger, 1987).  The test involves the 
estimation of following two equations:  
  mhgba tteyx+=x ++ j-tj
n
1=j
i-ti
m
1=i
t +-DDD åå 1      (5) 
  njqld ttj-tj
q
1=j
i-ti
p
1=i
t +++ uyx+=y 1-DDD åå     (6) 
where Dxt and  Dyt are the first-difference series of Korea’s exchange rate and the short-term debt ratio.  
They are individually I(0) stationary series.  The optimal lag lengths for m, n, p, and q of the lagged 
variables Dxt-i and Dyt-j are selected by the minimum AIC method.   The et-1 is the lagged residual series 
from the cointegrating equation (3) and ut-1 is the lagged residual series from the cointegrating equation 
(4).  mt and vt are the random error terms in the ECM.  The causal relationship in equation (5) is seen from 
the joint significance of the coefficients gj’s of   
Dyt-j’s .  The causal relationship in equation (6) is seen from the joint significance of the coefficients l i’s 
of Dxt-i’s (Granger, 1969; Hsiao, 1987).   The significance of the negative coefficients h and j represents 
the long-run adjustment process and the convergence of the two series.   
    ------------------------ 
    Place Table 3 here 
     ------------------------  
 The left-hand side of Table 3 presents the ECM regression results (note that the variable resid(-1) 
is et-1 in equation (5) and  resid(-1) is ut-1 in equation (6)).  The right-hand side of the table presents 
Wald’s coefficient test, the results of causality direction, and the long-run adjustment process of the 
series.  For equation (5), the optimal lag lengths are m = 2 and n = 1.  The Wald’s test for H0: g1  = 0 
shows that the F-statistic is 1.844, which has p-value = 0.19.  This means that the test is significant at the 
20% level.  Although this significance level is slightly higher than the usual practice of the 10% or 15% 
level, nevertheless, it did imply that there is a causality relationship running from Korea’s short-term debt 
ratio to the exchange rate.  In addition, the coefficient h is -0.527, which is significant at the 15% level.  
This implies that there exists a significant long-run adjustment process between the two variables.   
 On the other hand, for equation (6), the optimal lag lengths are p = 1 and q = 1.  The Wald’s test 
for H0: l1  = 0 shows that the F-statistic is 0.055, which is very small and has a large p-value at 0.82.  This 
means that the test is not significant even at the 20% level.  This implies that there is no feed back 
causality from Korea’s exchange rate to its short-term debt ratio.  In addition, the coefficient j is -0.836, 
which is significant at the 5% level.  This means that there exists a significant long-run adjustment 
process between the two variables, which is consistent with the results from equation (5).   
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 In sum, at the 20% significance level (a rather weak case), our results from ECM causality test 
indicate a unidirectional causality from Korea’s short-term debt ratio to the exchange rate.  Furthermore, 
the test results also show that there exists a long-run adjustment process between the two variables. 
 
7.  The causality test –the case of Taiwan 
For comparisons, we would like to use the same econometric techniques in the case of Korea 
above to examine the causality relation between Taiwan’s nominal exchange rate (NT$/US$) and the 
short-term debt ratio using the annual data from 1979 to 1998.  The data are taken from the same sources 
in the ICSEAD (1999, 2000).     
A. The unit-root test 
In the case of Taiwan, for the ADF unit-root test equation (1), the variable xt (level series) is the 
natural logarithm of Taiwan’s exchange rate series (or, xt is the short-term debt ratio series), and the other 
variables have the same definition.  Part 1 of Table 4 presents the test results of the level series.  Since 
both test-statistics are greater than their critical values at the 10% significance level, Taiwan’s exchange 
rate series and the short-term debt ratio series are not stationary.   
    ------------------------ 
    Place Table 4 here 
    ------------------------ 
Part 2 of Table 4 shows the test results of the first-difference series.  Since both calculated test-
statistics are less than their critical values at the 1% significance level, the first-difference series of 
Taiwan’s exchange rate and the short-term debt ratio are stationary, I(0), and their level series are  I(1). 
B. The cointegration test 
Table 5 presents the Engle-Granger’s cointegration test results.  When we use Taiwan’s exchange 
rate (xt ) as the dependent variable, the estimated cointegrating equation is: 
xt  =  3.619  -  0.032t  + 0.180yt        (7) 
where yt is the level series of Taiwan’s short-term debt ratio. When we use Taiwan’s short-term debt ratio 
as the dependent variable, the estimated cointegrating equation is: 
yt  =  0.194  +  0.008xt .                      (8) 
The ADF unit-root tests on the residual series et from equation (7) and ut from equation (8) above yield 
the test-statistics that are greater than their critical values at the 10% significance level.  Hense, et and ut 
series are not stationary.  Hence, Taiwan’s exchange rate series and the short-term debt ratio series are not 
cointegrated.  This finding is different from the case of Korea. 
 17
    ------------------------ 
    Place Table 5 here 
     ------------------------ 
C.  The standard Granger causality test   
 Although the level series of Taiwan’s exchange rate and the short-term debt ratio are not 
stationary and not cointegrated, the ir first-difference series are stationary.  We can use them in the short-
run dynamic model of the standard Granger causality test (SGCT) to examine their causality relationship.  
The SGCT model involves the estimation of the following two equations:  
  mgba tyx+=x ++ j-tj
n
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i-ti
m
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t DDD åå         (9) 
  nqld tj-tj
q
1=j
i-ti
p
1=i
t ++ yx+=y DDD åå       (10) 
where Dxt and  Dyt are the first-difference series of Taiwan’s exchange rate and the short-term debt ratio, 
respectively, and the other variables have the same definition as in equations (5) and (6).   
    ------------------------ 
    Place Table 6 here 
     ------------------------ 
 Table 6 presents the causality test results for Taiwan.  For equation (9), the optimal lag lengths 
are m = 1 and n = 1.  The Wald’s test for H0: g1  = 0 shows that the F-statistic is small at 0.234, which has 
large p-value at 0.64.  Therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis even at the 20% significance level.  
This implies that Taiwan’s short-term debt ratio does not cause the exchange rate.  On the other hand, for 
equation (10), the optimal lag lengths are p = 1 and q = 3.  The Wald’s test for H0: l1  = 0 shows that the 
F-statistic is very small at 0.067, which has a large p-value at 0.80.  Hence, like in equation (9), we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis even at the 20% significance level.   This implies that Taiwan’s exchange rate 
does not cause the short-term debt ratio.   
 In sum, the test results from the SGCT indicate that there is no causality relationship between 
Taiwan’s nominal exchange rate and the short-term debt ratio.  This finding is different from the case of 
Korea.  Again, our study has demonstrated that the short-term external debt to the international reserves 
ratio has very different impact on Korea’s and Taiwan’s exchange rates.  
 
8.   Conclus ion: lessons and challenges  
We have shown that macroeconomic fundamentals of the Korean economy were at least as good 
as those of Taiwan before the onset of the Asian financial crisis.  Yet, Taiwan has fared better than most 
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of the Asian countries, but Korea was severely affected.  Our figures show that the major difference 
between the two countries appears to be the external and financial sectors.  Korea has extremely high ratio 
of total external debt, in particular, the ratio of short-term external debt, to international reserves, along 
with the high ratio of cumulative inward portfolio investment to international reserves.  It is conceivable 
that a nation that has too much indebtedness heightens the vulnerability of the speculative attack of 
foreign capital.  When this occurs, all the four factors that cause the crisis, as we have explained in 
Section 2, will set in motion, resulting in currency and banking crises. 
The wave of financial crisis reached Taiwan by the end of July 1997, resulting in currency 
devaluation and stock price decline until the end of the year.  However, Taiwan consistently had large 
trade and current account surpluses, see [11] and [13] in Figures 5 and 6, abundant international reserves, 
see [16] in Figure 8, and above all, very low short-term external debt, see [14b] in Figure 7.  On the other 
hand, unlike Korea, as early as 1989, Taiwan already moved from the market average exchange rate 
system to completely flexible exchange rate regime (EPA, 1998, 270).  Thus, avoiding the extreme 
vulnerability to both banking and currency crises.  Furthermore, amply available internal capital funds, 
the large current account surpluses, the large share of government-held banks (55% by the end of 1996), 
the fear of capital flows from China, etc., did not motivate the Taiwanese to seek external borrowing 
actively.  The slower pace of Taiwan’s financial liberalization and internationalization24 also did not 
attract massive international indirect foreign investment inflows either25 (Fukushima and Takii, 1998, 
138; EPA, 1999, 177-180).    Ironically, while its slower pace of financial liberalization saved Taiwan, the 
planned acceleration of liberalization in the post-crisis era may pose a great challenge and renew 
instability in the future.26  
  Our causality test results show that the ratio of short-term external debt to international reserves 
and the nominal exchange rate have a quite different causality relationship between Taiwan and Korea.  
The two series for Taiwan are not cointegrated, and there is no causality relation between the two series.  
However, the two series for Korea are cointegrated, showing the existence of a long-run equilibrium 
relationship between the two series.  Furthermore,  the causality test results for Korea shows that the ratio 
of short-term external debt to international reserves causes unidirectional exchange rate fluctuations, but 
not vise versa.  Considering the different impacts of the financial crisis on Taiwan and Korea, these 
findings are consistent with our expectation.   
They are consistent with the fact that national currency depreciation and stock market fluctuations 
are the results of self-fulfilling herd behavior of highly speculative international short-term debt.  The 
unidirectional causality result is also consistent with the recent cross-sectional study of Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (2000, 478) that “a banking crisis increases the probability of that a country will fall prey to a 
currency crisis.”  The unidirectional causality may also rise from the fact that the banking crisis due to 
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sudden reversal of capital flow has more severe and protracted effects on economy than currency crisis 
(Calvo and Reinhart, 1999).  The prolonged attempt of the government to defend the national currency 
and to bail out the failed firms might aggravate the crisis (Radelet and Sachs, 1998).  The Taiwanese 
government intervened in the foreign exchange market heavily only a very short period from July to 
October 1997, preserving the precious international reserves,27 and keeping the already low short-term 
debt-to-reserves ratio reasonably low.   
In Korea, after a considerable debate, the government finally in December 3, 1997, accepted the 
rescue aid of US$ 57 billion from international organizations, including IMF, World Bank, etc., under 
stringent conditions of economic reform ( Fukushima and Takii, 1998, 141-142; Shim, 2000, 159-160).  
The conditions, which are challenges to the Korean government, include orderly reductions of the current 
account deficit, build-up international reserves and containment of inflationary pressures, improvement of 
financial sector transparency, market-oriented practice and supervision, and risk management, reduction 
of reliance on short-term debt, and allowance of foreign investment in Korean financial institutions, and 
establishment of foreign financial subsidies to promote competition (Shim, ibid.).  
As the financial reform and restructuring programs of chaebols proceeded rapidly and smoothly 
under the newly elected government, the economy started recovering during the first quarter of 1999.  
Reduction in domestic demand and imports (EPA, 1999, 158) prompted the unprecedented surpluses in 
trade balance and current account balance in 1998 (Figures 5 and 6), and spurted GDP growth in 1999 
(Figures 1 and 2).   The economy has continued recovering and the recovery seems real and lasting (EPA, 
2000, 151-161).   
What is the economic future of these two countries?  Recent prediction by the Asian 
Development Bank (2000, 242-243) is that the growth rate of real GDP (and real GDP per capita) for 
Korea is 7.5% and 6.0% (6.4% and 5.0%) in 2000 and 2001, respectively.  That for Taiwan is 6.3% and 
6.2% (5.1% and 5.4%) in 2000 and 2001, respectively.  The estimated figures are higher than most of the 
Asian countries, including China.  The continuous growth of the Korean and Taiwanese economies in the 
near future may be expected.   
It is likely that the 1997 financial crisis will induce vigorous restructuring of the Korean financial 
system and rationalization of its economy, and Korea and other Asian countries will come out as stronger 
competitors of Taiwan.  While Taiwan has fared better in the recent crisis, the need for restructuring and 
rationalization of its economy have also been revealed in this crisis, as its economy has also slowed down 
in recent years.  If Taiwan does not complete its own economic reform resolutely, its future exports 
competitiveness may suffer irrevocably.  The final impact of the Asian financial crisis is yet to be seen.  A 
great challenge to these two countries, as well as other Asian countries, is to complete the restructuring of 
financial and corporate sectors (Kawai, 2000), to improve regional integration and cooperation taking 
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lessons from the euro zone (Letiche, 2000).  These are basic steps to make the economic recovery lasting, 
and revive the “East Asian economic miracle” in the new millennium and the new internationa l economic 
order (Dutta, 2000). 
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Notes 
 
1 The impacts on the growth rates of real GDP in national currency were much less dramatic.  For Korea, in terms of 
1995 won, the percentage changes from 1997 to 1999 were 5.01%, -5.84%, and 8.50%, respectively.  For Taiwan, in 
terms of 1991 NT dollars, they were 6.77%, 4.65%, and 5.50%, respectively.  For Japan, in terms of 1990 yen, they 
were 1.59%, -2.50%, and 1%, respectively.  (ICSEAD, 2000, 60)   
2  Elsewhere we have shown that the real GDP per capita growth rates of these three countries in the postwar period 
(1951-1992) were highest among the 56 countries listed in Maddison (1995, Appendix D):  Taiwan, 6.03%, Korea, 
5.90%; Japan, 5.57% (Hsiao and Hsiao, 2000b, Table 1). 
3  In the prewar period (1911-1940), Korea’s real GDP per capita and its growth rate were consistently higher than 
those of Taiwan.  After the war (1951-1992), they have been consistently lower.  See Figure 2 and Table 1 in Hsiao 
and Hsiao (2000b).    
4  Taiwan’s price changes are calculated from consumer price indices in TSDB, 2000, 186.  The Korea’s price 
changes are calculated from “all cities consumer price indexes,” Bank of Korea, 1999, 200.   
5  Korea’s lending rates are from IMF, 1999, also in ICSEAD, 2000.  Taiwan’s lending rates are secured loans bank 
interest rates from TSDB, 2000, 164.  Also in ICSEAD, 2000. 
6  Calculated as exports (#20) minus imports (#34) in Table 2 of each country in ICSEAD, 2000. 
7  The original data were given as the ratio of international reserves to one-twelfth of the absolute value of the sum 
of the debits of goods, services, and income in balance of payment.  See the data sources and notes for each country 
in ICSEAD, 2000, Tables 5.2, 6.2, #55.   We take its inverse and then multiply by 100. 
8  Calculated as the inverse of the ratio of international reserves to the cumulative sum of inward portfolio 
investment from 1980 forward.  See the data sources and notes for each country in ICSEAD, 2000.   
9  The original data were given as the ratio of international reserves to the cumulative inward portfolio investment, 
which is calculated as the cumulative sum of inward portfolio investment from 1981 forward (ICSEAD, Tables 5.2 
and 6.2, #56 and footnote).  We take its inverse and then multiply by 100.   
10  It had been the general trend in East and Southeast Asia that during the early 1990s, capital flooded into the area 
and the share of foreign portfolio investment (FPI) was higher than that of foreign direct investment (FDI), except 
China, which did not de-regulate foreign portfolio investment. (EPA, 1998, 55).  In comparing Korea and Taiwan, 
Chen and Ku (2000, 127) suggested that Korean chaebols crowded out FDI, and so foreign capital could only invest 
in security markets.  
11 The indexes are taken as follows: For Taiwan, 1991=1; for Korea, 1995 = 1; and for Japan, 1990 = 1 (ICSEAD, 
2000, no. 43 of Table 1 of each country) 
12  Korea joined the prestigious OECD in 1996. 
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13  The herd behavior is not the monopoly of financial crisis.  For an overview of pull and push of capital flow and 
exchange rates, see Glick, ed. (1998).  Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000, 480) find that “In the 1980’s and 1990’s most 
liberalization episodes have been associated with financial crises of varying severity. … the twin crises may have 
common origins in the deregulation of the financial system …” 
14  The problem of moral hazard was prevalent in East Asian countries before the 1997 crisis, and it was one of the 
reasons that attracted massive foreign capital in the area during the 1990s.  Other reasons are deregulation of capital 
inflows, relatively high rates of interest, etc.  (EPA, 1998. 83).   
15  EPA, 1998, 145.  More generally, a long-run view is that “the system that produced the Asian crisis of 1997-98 
also produced the impressive economic performance of the previous two decades” (Crockett, 2000).   
16 Shim (2000, 146) quoted from another source.  However, according to EPA (1998, 82), the external capital ratios 
(external capital/(internal and external capital)) of  Korea in 1995-96 were 74% -76%, for Taiwan were about 55%, 
for Japan and the United States were 61% -66%, for Malaysia and Indonesia were 44%-58%.  While Korea’s ratio 
was high, it did not seem particularly alarming. 
17  EPA, 1998, 85-86.  This may be seen from the fact that the ruling government has been an émigré regime (Gold, 
1986) which has no root in the local business.  For Taiwan’s small-and-medium enterprises, see Hsiao and Hsiao, 
1996, 1999. 
18 In this system, the won per US dollar rate was “allowed to float in the interbank market within a daily range 
around the weighted average of the previous day’s interbank rates for spot transactions” (Shim, 2000, 146).  The 
allowed range of variation was ±1.5% up to December 1995, and expanded to ±10% in November 1997.   
19  1997 was also the year of presidential election in Korea.  The uncertainty of election outcome reduced propensity 
to invest (EPA, 2000, 146), which, coupled with the decrease in exports, turned the 1997 GDP growth rate to near 
negative 10%, see [2] in Figure 1.  Thus, the effect of Asian financial crisis is manifested only in 1998, during which 
the nominal GDP growth rate decreased more than 30%. 
20  In addition to London based Economist, as early as in the early 1996, IMF and Institute of Developing Economies 
in Tokyo had warned the vulnerability of the Thai economy (Abe, 1998, 3). 
21 Abe (1998) conducted a field work in Thailand in September 1997, and pointed out that the change in the fix 
exchange rate system to the managed floating exchange rate system in July 2, 1997 signaled the changes from an 
export-led growth to a bad-loans-ridden economy, and triggered the Thai financial crisis.  He delineates Thailand’s 
ten underlying problems which “are rather inherent, structural and long-term.” (ibid., 5, 41).  Also see Appendix: 
Thailand, A stylized chronology in Corbett and Vines (1999). 
22  Since foreign lenders and speculators’ behavior is generally based on the anticipation of the daily changes in 
nominal exchange rate, we adopted this as our variable.  Real exchange rates are useful in explaining the changes in 
trade performance and current account balance over the years. 
23   See Engle and Yoo (1987), Table 3.  We use the available critical value for sample size = 50. 
24  However, Chen and Ku (2000, 127) suggest “the timing and sequencing of capital account liberalization in 
Taiwan was quite similar to that in Korea.”  According to a short chronology of financial liberalization in EPA 
(1998, 57), Korea seems ran faster.  It is also not clear when the local banks were allowed to borrow money from 
foreign financial institutes.  Indonesia did it in March 1989. 
25  Fukushima and Takii, 1998, 138; EPA, 1999, 177-180.  For a discussion of economic and political liberalization 
from historical perspectives, see Hsiao and Hsiao (2000a).  For Taiwan’s globalization process, see Hsiao and Hsiao 
(2001).   Incidentally, China didn’t deregulate its capital market and strongly favored foreign direct investment.  
This is the major reason that China also weathered the financial crisis relatively well (EPA, 1998, 57).  
26  Recently, The Economist (November 11, 2000) and Business Week predicted debt problems in Taiwan in early 
next year.  Standard & Poors recently downgraded Taiwan’s economic rating from “stable” to “negative,” Taipei 
Journal , December 22, 2000, 3.  To our knowledge, none of the studies from Taiwan has been concerned about the 
possible instability due to accelerated financial reform.   Unlike foreign reports, Taiwanese scholars generally 
consider that Taiwan got around the recent Asian financial crisis through “sound” monetary and fiscal policies.  See 
papers in Policy Studies (1999). 
27  Hu, et al., 1998; Yang, 1998.  For surprisingly few other papers that deal with the financial crisis on Taiwan, see 
Chen and Ku (2000) and Wang (2000). 
Table 1.  ADF Unit-Root Test:  Korean Exchange Rate and 
the Short-term Debt Ratio
Part 1:  Level Series
MacKinnon
Variable k Test-statistic critical values
10%
Exchange rate (c, t) 1 -0.140 -3.286
Short-term debt ratio (c, t) 2 -2.743 -3.296
Part 2:  First-difference Series
MacKinnon
Variable k Test statistic critical values
1% 10%
Exchange rate (c, t) 7 -8.077 *** -5.115
Short-term debt ratio ( c ) 5 -2.805 * -2.704
Notes:
1.  The optimal lag length k is chosen at the minimum AIC from lag=1 to lags= 7.
2.  (c, t) denotes that the testing equation has included constant term ( c )
     and significant time trend (t).
3.  *** (*) denotes significant at the 1% (10%) level.
Table 2.  Engle-Granger's Cointegration Test:  Korean Exchange Rate and the Short-term Ratio
Step 1: Step 2:
Cointegrating regression ADF unit-root test Engle-Yoo
on residual series critical values
Cointegrating const. t Indep. vari.
equation  a0 a1 a2 adj R
2
Series k Test-statistic 10%
x = f(c, t, y) 6.119 0.035 0.071 0.578 e 2 -3.031 * -2.90
    (  0 )a    ( 0 )a   (0.01)a
y = f(c, t, x) -27.445 -0.290 4.970 0.574 u 2 -3.168 * -2.90
  (0.02)b   ( 0 )a (0.01)a
Notes:
1. The p-values are in the parentheses. 
2. For step 1: H0 is that the coefficient equals to zero in the standard t-test.
     a and b denote that the test is significant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.   
3. For step 2: * denotes rejection of H0: a unit-root (no cointegration) at the
     10% significance level.
Table 3.  ECM Causality Test:  Korean Exchange Rate and the Short-term Debt Ratio
ECM Regression Wald's coefficient test Causality Long-run
Adjustment
Dep. var. constant Dx(-1) Dx(-2) Dy(-1) resid(-1) adj R2 Ho F-statistic
Dx 0.000 1.679 -0.442 -0.032 -0.527 0.599 g1=0 1.844 1.844 D.R.--->Ex.R. D.R.-->Ex.R.
    (0.99)     ( 0 )a (0.20)e    (0.20)e   (0.13)d (0.19)e      ( e )      ( d )
Dy -0.053 0.993    --- 0.125 -0.836 0.162 l1=0 0.055 0.031 Ex.R. does not Ex.R.--->D.R.
    (0.87)    (0.82)       (0.74)    (0.04)b (0.82)   cause D.R.      ( b )
Notes:
1.  The p-values are in the parentheses.
2.  The a, b, c, d, and e denote that the test is significant at the 1%, 5%, 10%, 15%, and 20% level, respectively. 
3.  Ex.R. = Exchange Rate and D.R. = Short-term Debt Ratio.
Table 4.  ADF Unit-Root Test:  Taiwan's Exchange Rate and 
the Short-term Debt Ratio
Part 1:  Level Series
MacKinnon
Variable k Test-statistic critical values
10%
Exchange rate (c) 1 -2.027 -2.693
Short-term debt ratio (c, t) 5 -3.168 -3.446
Part 2:  First-difference Series
MacKinnon
Variable k Test statistic critical values
1%
Exchange rate (c, t) 3 -5.382 *** -5.115
Short-term debt ratio ( c ) 2 -4.298 *** -4.137
Notes: Same as notes 1, 2, and 3 in Table 1.
Table 5.  Engle-Granger's Cointegration Test: Taiwan's Exchange Rate and 
the Short-term Debt Ratio
Step 1: Step 2:
Cointegrating regression ADF unit-root test Engle-Yoo
on residual series critical values
Cointegrating const. t Indep. vari. Test-
equation  a0 a1 a2 adj R
2
Series k statistic 10%
x = f(c, t, y) 3.619 -0.032 0.180 0.643 e 1 -1.817 -2.90
    (  0 )a    ( 0 )a (0.83)
y = f(c, x)n 0.194     ---   0.008 0.002 u 3 -1.149 -2.90
  (0.27) (0.88)
Notes:
1. Same as note 1 in Table 2.
2. Same as note 2 in Table 2 and n denotes that the equation has no significant time trend.
3. For step 2: H0 is that the residual series has a unit-root. 
Table 6.  Granger's Causality Test:  Taiwan's Exchange Rate and the Short-term Debt Ratio
Regression Wald's coefficient test Causality
Dep. var. constant Dx(-1) Dy(-1) Dy(-2)Dy(-3) adj R2 Ho F-statistic
Dx -0.015 0.427 -0.294 0.093 0.666 g1=0 0.234 1.844 D.R. does not
    (0.45)   (0.17)e    (0.64) (0.64)   cause Ex.R.
Dy 0.006 -0.028 -0.248 -0.356 -0.2 0.095 l1=0 0.067 0.031 Ex.R. does not
    (0.41)    (0.80)     (0.45)    (0.18)e     (0.53) (0.80)   cause D.R.
Notes:  Same as notes 1, 2, and 3 in Table 3.
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Figure 2. GDP Per Capita and Its Growth Rates
in US dollars
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
1989 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98
U
S
$ 
10
00
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
[3] GDPpc
[4] %gGDPpc
(TKJ)
J/10
K
T
%
Figure 4 Broad Money(M2)/GDP and Unemployment 
Rates
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Figure 3.  Inflation Rates, Lending Rates,
 and Overall Fiscal Surplus/GDP
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Figure 8.  Int'l Reserves 
and Short Term Debt/Reserves
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Figure 5.  BOT and Monthly Import-Reserve Ratios
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Figure 6.  CAB and Cum Inward Portfolio
 Invt-Res Ratio
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Figure 7.  Total External Debt 
and Its Ratio to Reserves
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Figure 9.  Average Exchange Rates Per US$ and 
Percentage Changes
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Figure 10.  Year-end Stock Indexes and 
Percentage Changes
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